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Why the St. Ruch? Why the Northwest Passage? Why 1940? 
New Answers to Old Questions 
For  almost  half  a  century,  the  reasons  behind  orders  sending 
the  RCMP  schooner St. Roch through  the  Northwest  Passage 
during  the  Second  World  War  have  puzzled  historians  and  other 
scholars.  True,  there  were umours of a  defence-related  mission, 
but there was no hard  evidence, no tangible  proof.  Nor  did  the 
captain, Sgt. Henry Larsen, provide many clues other than 
“Canada  was  at  war  and  the  government  had  realized  the  need 
to  demonstrate  the  country’s  sovereignty  over  the  Arctic 
islands” (Larsen, 1967), a statement not verified in official 
documents.  Then  unexpectedly  last  year,  during  research on 
Canadian  wartime  relations  with  Greenland, two memos  were 
found  in  RCMP  archival  files  that  directly  linked  the  voyage 
of the St. Roch to  a  government  plan  to  defend  and  occupy  the 
island in the spring of 1940 (Caulkin, 1940; Fripps, 1940). 
Subsequent  evidence  from  Larsen’s  personal  papers  confirms 
that  the  captain  was  fully  aware  of  the  original  purpose  of  his 
mission (Larsen, 1957a,b). 
Although  these  memos  might  appear to  contradict  Larsen’s 
own  explanation,  careful  study of the  documents  and  related 
circumstances  suggests  that  the  reference  to  sovereignty in the 
autobiography  published  posthumously  could  also  be  defined 
in  very  broad terms to include  security  considerations.  Omission 
of any reference  to  the  initial  motive  behind  the  orders was 
entirely  in  keeping  with  his  responsibility  as  a  member of the 
The Sr. Roch moored to ice in  the  Western  Arctic  in  the mid-1930s.  According  to Henry  Larsen,  the only major changes  made to the ship in 1940  were  the 
addition of ‘‘a little  auxilliary  engine  to  charge  the bank of batteries” and new shoeing around the  stem to create  a “knife sharp bow” (Larsen, 1967). Refitting 
at Halifax during winter 1943-44 made other changes. Credit: Parks Canada, St. Rcch National Historic Site Division. 
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Royal  Canadian  Mounted  Police  to  maintain  a  confidence  in 
the national interest. Today, the rationale for that secrecy 
is no longer  valid,  and  the  once-secret  documents  explaining 
the  circumstances  and  events are now accessible  to  the  public. 
Perhaps it was a stroke of fate that this information should 
come  to  light  during  the  50th-anniversary  celebrations  of  the 
venerable  ship’s  historic  voyage through the  Northwest  Passage. 
Along  with pride of achievement  is now  added  new  pride  of 
a  greater  purpose. 
What was the  crisis  that  triggered  Canadian  plans  to  occupy 
Greenland, and  what  possible  role  was  the  RCMP  expected  to 
play?  These  questions  involve  a  much  longer  narrative,  already 
related by  James  Eayrs  (1965:  169-171)  and C.P. Stacey 
(1970:367-370), whose accounts were based primarily on 
files  originating  with  External  Affairs  and  National  Defence 
respectively.  The  RCMP  commissioner’s  files  do  not  contradict 
these narratives, but they do add further details of police 
involvement. A synopsis of events provides background to 
the  involvement of the St. Roch and  explanation of the  secrecy 
surrounding  her  mission. 
In  the  winter  and  early  spring of 1940,  public  attention was 
focused on events  abroad  as  Germany  advanced  across  Europe. 
When Denmark fell on 9 April 1940, British and Canadian 
military  strategists  were  understandably  concerned  about  the 
future of the Danish colony of Greenland. In light of the 
increasing  German  U-boat  activity  in  the  North  Atlantic,  defence 
of the  large  ice-covered  island  was  considered  a  matter of  high 
priority,  partially  because of its location on the  periphery of 
North  America  and  its  excellent  harbours  for  submarine  bases, 
but also  because of the  cryolite  mine  situated on the  shores  of 
an isolated 12-mile fiord in southwest Greenland. 
Cryolite was crucial  in  the  production f  aluminum,  and  this 
one  mine  represented  the  only  natural  source  available  to  the 
Allied war industries. Although a synthetic substitute had 
recently  come on the  market,  the  Greenland  mine  was  the  only 
known sources  of  the  raw  mineral,  with  the  only  refineries  being 
in  Denmark,  the  Penn-Salt  Company  in  the  United  States,  and 
the  Aluminum  Company  of  Canada,  located  at  Arvida,  Quebec. 
Previously,  Britain  relied on production  from  Danish  smelters, 
and  to  a  lesser  extent  upon  Norwegian  refineries  that  used  the 
synthetic  alternative.  With  both  countries  now  in  German  hands, 
the Allies were dependent on United States and Canadian 
production. As  long  as  the  United  States  remained  neutral  and 
was utilizing vast quantities of aluminum for its own war 
industry,  it was considered  urgent  that  ALCAN  gain  assured 
access  to  the  Greenland  cryolite.  Should  Germany  have  decided 
to  take  over  or  merely  sabotage  the  mine,  the  effect  would  have 
crippled  the  British  and  Canadian  war  efforts  (Department  of 
External Affairs, 1940a,b). 
Adding  to  the  urgency  were “reports of  enemy  ships  heading 
in  the  direction  of  Iceland  and  Southern  Greenland”  (Secretary 
of State, 1940) and requests from the United Kingdom “of 
utmost importance to obtain maximum possible tonnage of 
aluminum from Canada” (Department of External Affairs, 
1940a). Encouraged to take action by officials of the U.K. 
government  (Massey,  1940)  and  the  Aluminum  Company of 
Canada (Bruce, 1940a,b,c), it is not surprising that Canada 
would  seriously  cbnsider  all  means  to  protect  Allied  interests. 
At first hesitant to commit forces and concerned about the 
“danger of disturbing American opinion,” Mackenzie King 
finally agreed, with the proviso that Canada was merely 
looking  into  the  defence  of  Greenland  in  cooperation  with  British 
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forces,  otherwise  Canada  would  be  “blamed  for  taking over” 
(Skelton, 1940a). 
High-level  discussion  followed  based on reports  prepared by 
External  Affairs  (Skelton,  1940b).  Initially,  the  objective  was 
clearly  precautionary: “to prevent  enemy  nationals  gaining  a 
foothold  there  and  giving  them  an  opportunity  to  sabotage  the 
cryolite  mines.” In the  Royal  Canadian  Navy’s  (RCN)  estima- 
tion,  only  a  small  force  would be required  to  occupy  the  island 
“and  a  small  police  detail  at  the  two  or  three  more  important 
centres  is  all  that  will  be  necessary  to  maintain.”  Whether  this 
was a  realistic  assessment or not,  the  navy  did not have  frigates 
or  destroyers  available  for  the  mission,  nor  would “any of  these 
ships be risked in the ice conditions prevalent in the Davis 
Strait. ” Instead,  it  was  suggested  that  the  CGS N.B. McLeun 
could “easily be armed with 4 in. guns” (Department of 
National Defence, 1940a). 
On 14  April,  a  subcommittee  meeting  chaired by the  director 
of Military Operations and Intelligence supported plans for 
defence  of  the  mine  and  occupation  of  the  former  Danish  colony, 
with the recommendation that an advance party of 100 - 
including 12 RCMP officers and constables - proceed to 
Greenland in  early May aboard the icebreaker  CGS N.B. McLean. 
The  expedition  was  given  the  illustrious  name  of “Force X,” 
and alI supplies  and  participants  were  to  be  mobilized  and  ready 
for  departure  within two weeks.  Their  task  was  to  select  gun 
sites  and  lay  out  a  military  camp  in  preparation  for  the  arrival 
of the  main  contingent. Clearly, though,  RCMP  detachments 
were  considered  critical  to  the  success of the  mission  (Depart- 
ment of National  Defence,  1940b,c). 
The  Chiefs of  Staff  Committee  subsequently  issued  a  formal 
document  that  expanded on the  details  to  include  specific  lists 
of  participants  and  necessary  equipment.  The  main  body of the 
occupation  force  would  constitute an army  unit  of  approximately 
250  to arrive in  early  June. In addition  to  the  mine  location, 
small occupation forces would be posted to the two Danish 
administrative centres, Godhavn and Godthaab, on the west 
coast  of  Greenland.  The  cost  of  establishing  and  maintaining 
the  occupation  forces  for  one  year  was  estimated  at $585 O00, 
excluding  purchase of armaments  and  RCMP  expenses 
(Department  of  National  Defence,  194Od,e). 
After the 14 April meeting, Imp. T.B. Caulkin, A/A/C 
“G” Division,  sent  a  memo to the  commissioner  suggesting  the 
names  of four  officers for Greenland  duty.  He  also  raised  the 
question of employing  the St. Roch: 
It is considered  that  the R.C.M.P. schooner St. Roch  would 
be of inestimable  value  to  our  Personnel  stationed  at  Godhavn 
and  Godthaab  and  would be in  communication  with  the  Force 
Headquarters by wireless. 
If  approval is  given  to have  the  St.  Roch  proceed  from  the 
Pacific to the Eastern theatre, I feel confident that Sergt. [sic] ’ 
Larsen would prove a valuable man in that area in several 
different ways. 
If  the St. Roch  should go, consideration  might be. given to 
increasing  the  personnel  on  the  boat, also whether  she  should 
be  armed  with  at  least  a  machine  gun. 
Further,  arrangements  would  have to be made  for  some  fuel 
to be sent in for her, such as diesel oil, etc., this could be 
despatched from Montreal later [Caulkin, 19401. 
Considering  that  in  1940  Canada  had no arctic  airstrips  and 
no RCN vessels available for polar navigation, the RCMP 
schooner  was  a  logical  support  ship  and  patrol  vessel. 
After  retirement  of  the  CGS Beothic in  1932,  the  Canadian 
government  had  rented  space on the Hudson’s  Bay  Company 
~. 
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ship  the Nascopie for  the  Eastern  Arctic  Patrol,  which  supplied 
the RCMP posts and provided medical aid to the isolated 
communities. While the Nascopie was also participating in 
the  war effort, it  was still  needed  to  supply  the  company’s  fur 
trading  posts.  Thus  it was logical  that  the  RCMP  should  have 
its  own  means  of  supply  and  transportation  in  the  Eastern  Arctic 
quite  apart  from  other  duties  it  might  fulfil  as  part of security 
measures.  The St. Roch was  the  only  ice-capable  police  vessel 
of  any  appreciable size available  for  arctic  patrols  and,  if  neces- 
sary, to  serve  as  a  communications  and  supply  link  with  the 
proposed Canadian occupation forces in Greenland and the 
newly  established  consulate.  The  ship’s  home  port  was  Vancou- 
ver, as  its  primary  function  since  1930  had  been  to  supply  and 
patrol  the  Western  Arctic.  The  plan  to  bring  the  ship  to  the 
Eastern  Arctic  through  the  Northwest  Passage  seemed  a  logi- 
cal  solution,  since  a  southern  route  through  the  Panama  Canal 
would  have  destroyed  any  attempt  at  keeping  the  mission  secret. 
As a  consequence,  on  16  April  Commissioner  Wood  wrote 
to  Insp.  James  Fripps, of the  west  coast “E” Division,  with 
explicit instructions to contact Sgt. Larsen and discuss the 
matter. Fripps’s reply was: 
Strictly  Confidential  Vancouver, B.C. 22. April. 1940. 
1. This will  acknowledge  receipt  of  your letter dated the 16th 
inst., on  the  19th.  inst.  I  proceeded to Victoria  and  on  the 20th 
inst. I discussed  the  matter  with Sgt. Larsen  that  it was  your 
intention if possible to have the schooner  “St.  Roch”  proceed 
through the North-West Passage to Greenland after she had 
discharged  the  supplies for Coppennine and  Cambridge Bay 
Detachments. Sgt. Larsen  stated  he would be pleased to make 
this  proposed patrol as he  always  had  a desire to travel  through 
the  North-West  Passage. He recommended  that the St. Roch 
should  pass  through  the  North-West  Passage  during  the  month 
of August, not later, and  to  do this it was absolutely  essential 
that the “St.  Roch”  depart  from  Vancouver not later than  the 
20th. of June next. 
2. Further he  recommended  that  no  extra  duties  should be given 
to the “St. Roch” other than  delivering  supplies  to  the 
Detachments. Sgt. Larsen will require an  Admiralty  Chart of 
Greenland and the North-West Passage. This would include 
Baffi Island. 
Fripps  concludes  the  memo  with “I impressed  upon Sgt. Larsen 
that this matter  was  to  be  treated  strictly  confidential  and  not 
to be discussed  with  any  other  member  of  the  Force. ” He  also 
refers  to  a  previous  request  for  a “se skiff” and  outboard  motor 
made  by  Larsen  to Imp. Caulkin  while  in  Ottawa  (Fripps,  1940). 
Together, these two memos testify that approval for the 
St. Roch’s voyage was not confirmed until mid-April, that 
approval was related directly to the proposed occupation of 
Greenland,  and  that  besides  Larsen  and  Commissioner  Wood, 
both  Insp.  Fripps  and  Insp.  Caulkin  were  fully  informed of the 
plans.  The  second  memo  also  confirms,  however,  that  Larsen 
was  indeed  in  Ottawa  in  early  spring  and,  as  suggested  in  his 
autobiography,  may  well  have  discussed  the  feasibility of taking 
the  ship  to  the  Eastern  Arctic  with  his  commanding  officer  and 
perhaps  informally  with  the  commissioner.  Formal  approval 
came  later. 
Additional  evidence  supports  the  contention  that  Larsen  was 
fully  aware of the  primary  purpose  of  the  voyage.  In  corre- 
spondence with the current RCMP commissioner in 1957, 
Larsen  defended  himself  against  implied  criticism  by  the cap ain 
of  the Nascopie and  explained  the  circumstances  leading  to  the 
St. Roch’s voyage  through  the  Passage in 1940-42: 
Re: Schooner “St. Roch” - R.C.M. Police, 
P/P 
Memo with instructions for the St. Roch to proceed through the Northwest 
Passage. Source: National Archives of Canada, RCMP records. 
The  reason for this, I believe,  was  that prior to  the “St. Roch” 
leaving  Vancouver  on its eastward journey through the Arctic, 
Denmark  had  been  invaded  and  Greenland  was  more or less 
left on its own. Had the “St. Roch”  managed  to  navigate the 
Northwest  Passage  that year it  is my understanding  that our 
Government  was  planning to send  her to Greenland.  I  believe 
also that  a  Canadian  Consulate was established  in  Greenland 
about  that time, and  I  understand  this was one of the reasons 
why the “St. Roch” was  instructed to proceed  eastward  in  1940 
[Larsen, 1957al. 
The  last  statement  is  particularly  important,  since  discussion 
of a  Canadian  Consulate  in  Greenland  did  not  arise  until  April 
1940  and  was  not  approved  until  mid-May.  This  reference  to 
the  consulate  partly  explains  continuation  of  the  voyage  after 
the  ‘‘Occupation’’  plans  were  cancelled:  Larsen  also  claimed  that 
the  fuel  left  at  Pond  Inlet by the Nascopie in  1940  was  for  use 
by the  RCMP  ship  that  was  expected  to  winter  in  Greenland 
(Larsen,  1957a)  or  “some  designated  spot  in  the  Eastern  Arctic” 
(Larsen,  1957b).  The  question of  who  would  protect  or  defend 
Greenland  was  not  officially  decided  until  the  following  year. 
In  the  same letter, Larsen  also  alludes  to  sovereignty  reasons 
and,  “being  utilized  to  advantage  in  the  Eastern Arctic,” with 
specific  reference  to  the  closure  of  the  police posts at  Dundas 
Harbour,  Craig  Harbour  and Bache  Peninsula  (Larsen,  1957b). 
This rationale  was  likely  part  of  earlier  informal  discussions, 
since  sovereignty  concerns per se do  not  appear  in  the  memos 
confirming approval and instructions in mid-April, unless 
defined  to  include  national  security  and  efence.  When 
considering  the  1940  police  memos  together  with  Larsen’s  later 
explanations,  it  appears  there may  have  been  multiple  reasons 
for  the  voyage,  perhaps  shifting  in  priority  relative  to  changing 
circumstances in 1940. 
In  wartime  especially,  events  rarely  happen  as  planned,  and 
the  Canadian  strategy  to  occupy  Greenland  was  no  exception. 
The  initial  rationale  for  “Force X” was  the  mistaken  belief  that 
a  small  Canadian  occupation  force  would be more  acceptable 
to  the  neutral  United  States  than  British  intervention,  which 
would have clearly violated the principles of the Monroe 
Doctrine  (Skelton,  1940b). This opinion  could  not  have  been 
further  from  the  truth. 
At a meeting between Prime Minister King and President 
Roosevelt on 2 May 1940, Roosevelt made it clear that the 
United States wished no occupying force on Greenland, but 
admitted  that  if there  were  a  German  attack,  then “it would  be 
necessary  for  Allied  Naval  Forces  to  take  action.”  Secretary 
of State  Hull  seemed  to  be of a  different  mind,  referring  to 
considerations of the  Monroe  Doctrine  (Skelton, 1940~). That 
same day, the acting minister of National Defence abruptly 
ordered  the  demobilization  of “Force X” and “all action  in 
connection  with it  suspended”  (Department  of  National  Defence, 
194Of).  Supplies  already  in  storage  were  dispersed  and  mobili- 
zation  orders  cancelled. 
As  explained  in  confidential  memos  and  minutes,  the US.  
Secretary of State  was  “insistently  anxious”  that  any  plans  to 
occupy Greenland be dropped (Reid, 1940b). The ensuing 
discussions  and  ebates  clarified  the  State  Department’s 
contention  that  the  current  interpretation  of  the MONW Doctrine 
rejected  the  right of any third  party  to  interfere  in  the  political 
or military affairs of Greenland.  As  an  alternative,  the  State 
Department believed the mine could be defended by local 
residents  with  armaments  upplied by the  United  States. 
Pressured by British  officials  to  take  action,  yet  unwilling  to 
oppose  the firm wishes  of  the  United  States,  Canadian  officials 
were  caught  in a dilemma  (Eden,  1940;  Department  of  External 
Affairs, 1940b,c). 
One  might  well  ask  why, if “Force X” was cancelled, was 
the St. Roch still  proceeding  to  Greenland?  When  viewed  in 
retrospect,  the  emotions  and  fears  attached to Germany’s  march 
across  Europe may seem  unwarranted,  but  in  the  summer of 
1940,  the  security of Greenland  and  the  Eastern  Arctic  was 
considered  critical  to  prevent  the  spread of hostilities  to  North 
America.  And  as  Canadian  fears  mounted,  a number  of 
defensive  contingency  plans  were  hastily  set  in  motion  in  an 
effort  to  stem  the  advance of the  aggressors. With  increasing 
enemy  activity  in  the  North  Atlantic  and  without  a firm commit- 
ment  by  the  United  States  to  defend  Greenland,  the  decision 
to  have  the St. Roch on  standby  in  the  Eastern  Arctic  seems 
logical.  Whether  it  was  feasible  depended  on  the  ability  of  the 
captain  and  the St. Roch to  navigate  the  Northwest  Passage. 
As events unfolded, the governors of North and South 
Greenland  claimed  constitutional  powers  to  take  absolute 
control  in  the  event  of  an  emergency,  yet  were  without  military 
capabilities to defend against an enemy attack. The Danish 
minister in Washington, meanwhile, claimed that he in turn 
represented  the  two  governors  and  established  the  American- 
Danish Greenland Commission to act as an advisory body 
(Department  of  External  Affairs,  1940).  In  1940,  neither  the 
United Kingdom nor Canada was prepared to challenge the 
legitimacy  of  these actions. Still at  issue was the status  of  existing 
contracts for the  cryolite  production. 
ARCTIC  PROFILES / 85 
Prior to the fall of Denmark, the Penn Salt Company of 
Philadelphia  had  retained  a  monopoly  over  the  North  American 
market,  which  involved  one-third of the  mine’s  exports.  The 
Aluminum  Company  of  Canada,  however,  had  hoped  to  acquire 
the European contracts with the Danish refineries, assuring 
Allied  control of all  exports not  under  contract  to  Penn  Salt. 
In addition, this would strengthen the wartime economy by 
adding revenue to the Canadian treasury. The proposal was 
presented at a meeting attended by representatives of the 
Canadian  and  U. S. governments,  the  chairman  of  the  American- 
Danish  Greenland  Commission,  and  the  presidents  of  Penn  Salt 
and the Aluminum Company of Canada. As expected, the 
American  representatives  refused  to  entertain  any  proposal  that 
did  not  give the United  States  company  clear  access to the  mine’s 
postwar  production  (Department  of  External  Affairs, 1940~). 
While negotiations continued in an attempt to resolve the 
impasse, the Nascopie had departed from Halifax without 
fanfare  and  was  heading  northward  to  Greenland,  ostensibly 
“to deliver  staple  supplies”  as  a  relief  measure,  but  with  the 
expressed  hope  that  “arrangements  could  be  made  also  for  return 
cargo of about  two  thousand  tons” of cryolite.  On  board was 
the  Canadian  vice-consul  to  Greenland, A.E. Porsild  (Skelton, 
194Od). Others included Canadian artillery officers, mining 
engineers, and RCMP officers. At the same time, another 
vessel,  the Julius Wmsen ,  was  en  route  to  Greenland  from 
England,  carrying  the  new  Canadian  consul  and  senior  diplomat, 
K.P. Kirkwood, along  with  several  British  naval  officers  (Reid, 
1940a). 
Also heading for Greenland and several days in the lead 
was the United States Coast Guard cutter the Comanche, 
carrying armaments and the newly appointed U.S. consul. 
First  on his agenda  was a  tour of the  cryolite  mine,  which  would 
also  allow  the  American  ship  to  guard  the  fiord  against  any 
uninvited “visitors” who  might  wish  to  assume  control  of  the 
mine  (Skelton, 194Oe). In Vancouver,  meanwhile,  the St. Roch 
continued  preparations  for  its  voyage  through  the  Northwest 
Passage. 
The arrival of the Nascopie and the Julius Thomsen in 
Greenland  did  not  escape  the  attention  of  the  outspoken  assistant 
US. secretary of state,  Adolf  Berle,  who  called two emergency 
meetings  on 3 June - first  with  British  diplomats,  then  the 
Canadians.  In  his  view,  the  presence  of  Canadian  and  British 
military officers aboard the two ships represented a blatant 
attempt by the Aluminum Company of Canada to secure 
possession  of  the  cryolite  mine.  Admitting  he  was  dispensing 
with  diplomatic  niceties,  Berle  declared  that  the  president  had 
been  notified of Canada’s  actions  and  had  stated  he  would  be 
“very angry” if  Canada  attempted  to  occupy  Greenland.  The 
assistant  secretary  went  on  to  say  that  “this  was  not  the  time 
for this type of  1890  imperialism  and  that  the  days of Cecil 
Rhodes had passed.” In his  opinion, this incident  only  confirmed 
his belief  that “the Aluminum  Company  of  Canada  was  trying 
to  take  advantage of the  present  situation  in  order  to  get  control 
of the  cryolite  mine. ” Canadian  officials  were  given  a  clear 
warning  that  defence of the  mine  was  not  their  responsibility 
and  that  access  to  the  cryolite  was  dependent  upon  cooperation 
with  the  United  States  (Department  of  External  Affairs,  194Od). 
Three  days later, the  question of Greenland’s  and  Iceland’s 
futures  evoked  a  long  and  heated  debate  in  the  United  States 
Senate;  Citing  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  the  basis for the  U. S. 
right to intervene, the Senate was also told of Greenland’s 
economic  importance,  not just because of the  cryolite  but  for 
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its  potential  resources  of  mica,  graphite,  gold  and  hydro-electric 
power. Also discussed was the possibility of negotiating a 
purchase or takeover  of  the  island  (United  States  Government, 
1940). Yet regardless of the  urgency  expressed  in  the  debate,  it 
was  almost  a  year  before  the  United  States  would  formally  and 
unilaterally  assume  full  responsibility  for  the  defence  of  Iceland 
and Greenland. At that time, the United States again firmly 
rejected  Canada’s  offer  of  assistance,  stating  that  its  participation 
was “not  required”  (Department of  External  Affairs,  1941). 
Although  ice-bound  in  the  Western  Arctic  the  first  winter, 
the St. Roch continued  to  plough  eastward on its  voyage  through 
the  Northwest  Passage,  apparently  still  under  secret  orders  and 
with  extra  supplies  for  the  next  year  picked  up  at  Tuktoyaktuk. 
When  the  Japanese  bombed  Pearl  Harbor on 7  December  194 1, 
the  schooner  was  again  stuck  fast  in  the  ice,  this  time jus  south 
of  Boothia  Peninsula.  Now  well  past  the  halfway  mark,  there 
was no recourse but to  continue.  According  to  Larsen, by the 
time  they  had  reached  Pond  Inlet,  the  Americans  had  “pretty 
well  taken  over in Greenland”  (Larsen,  1957a).  As  the  fortunes 
of  war  continued  to  favour  the  Allies  in  the  North  Atlantic,  the 
St. Roch was ordered to return west in 1944, this time via 
Lancaster  Sound. 
Given  that  the  1940  voyage  of  the St. Roch was  approved 
initially because of  Canadian  plans  to  occupy  Greenland  and 
continued  for  a  number  of  wartime-related  considerations,  there 
are still  a number  of  questions  outstanding.  Why,  when 
acknowledging the fact to his commanding officer in 1957, 
would  Larsen  fail  to  mention  the  defence of Greenland  in  his 
autobiography? Why mention an earlier discussion with the 
commissioner  in  Ottawa, if the  orders  were not  finalized  and 
approved until mid-April? Why was the manuscript of the 
autobiography not published during his lifetime? Are there 
logical  reasons  to  explain  these  actions by a man  known for  his 
honesty,  integrity,  and  loyalty  to  the  traditions of  the  Force? 
There are reasons - some  more  obvious  than  others. 
In  the  first  instance,  the  proposed  Canadian  occupation  of 
Greenland  was “top  secret” and Larsen was  specifically  warned 
that  “the  matter  was  strictly  confidential  and  not  to  be  discussed 
with  any  member  of  the  Force” (Fripps, 1940).  Indeed,  one 
account  alleged  that  even  his  wife  did  not  know  of  the  ship’s 
destination (Tranter, 1945:2).  Initially  a military secret, 
diplomatic  concerns  compounded  the  potential  sensitivities  that 
might  result  from  inopportune  disclosure  of  the  Canadian  plans. 
Thus  it  was  expected  that  Larsen  and  his  superiors  would  be 
bound  by their  strict  code of ethics  to  maintain  that  confidence. 
But why was it important to maintain the secrecy about 
“Force X” over  20  years  after  the  fact?  As  noted  above,  both 
James  Eayrs  in  1965  and C.P. Stacey  in  1970  freely  discussed 
the  plans  to  occupy  Greenland  in  their  respective  publications 
covering  the  events  of  World  War II. Here,  too,  there  is  a  logical 
explanation,  particularly  obvious  to  an  historian,  concerning  the 
25-year  rule  restricting  public  disclosure  of  confidential  govern- 
ment  documents  relating  to  Canadian-American  relations.  The 
fact  that  Larsen  did  not  submit his manuscript  for  publication 
during  his  lifetime  may  suggest  he  had  valid  reasons.  Henry 
Larsen died in September 1964 - one year short of being 
released from the limitation of the 25-year rule. Would the 
manuscript  have been changed  otherwise?  Only  Larsen  could 
have  answered  that  question. 
Was  Larsen  less  than  truthful  in  his  autobiography?  Hardly. 
In  the  first  place,  if  there  were  omissions or “poetic licence,” 
it was only in an unpublished manuscript that continued to 
“maintain  the  confidence, ” as  instructed  in  April  1940.  Likely 
Larsen  and  the  commissioner  did  discuss  sovereignty  concerns 
and possible plans for the St. Roch in the Eastern Arctic as 
suggested, but apparently without final approval until the 
Greenland situation became critically unstable. In an earlier 
report,  Larsen  did  state  that  it was “the spring of 1940” when 
they received their assignment from Commissioner Wood 
(Larsen,  n.d.). If there  were  discrepancies, they  were  rooted 
in the code of ethics governing RCMP actions in “national 
interests” - and  a  tribute  to  an  officer of the  highest  integrity. 
The St. Roch’s two  voyages  through  the  Northwest  Passage 
were  just  cause  for  celebration  in  a  war-weary  Canada - a truly 
notable achievement by a Canadian ship in her own arctic 
waters.  This  venture  was  not  “something  of  a  stunt or a  trip 
to compete with the Nuscopie” (Larsen, 1957b), as implied 
by the  Hudson’s Bay  Company  captain,  but a  fitting  tribute  to 
the prowess of the hardy St. Roch and the able men who 
sailed  her  into  the  annals of history  half  a  century  ago.  As  for 
Henry  Asbjorn  Larsen?  In  his  words,  “had  it  not  been  for  the 
war, we  would  never  have  had  the  occasion or opportunity  to 
make  this  passage”  (Larsen,  195%). Yet those  who  knew him 
also knew he was “delighted to have the opportunity. . . . 
A correct  and  careful  police  officer,  he  was  an  adventurer  at 
heart” (Roots, 1992). 
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